A number of researchers have shown that stocks seem to perform poorly in the three to five years following their IPO. In a recent paper (Schultz (2003) ), I suggest that a subtle bias in the calculation of long-run abnormal returns may be at least partly responsible for the poor longrun performance of IPOs. This bias, which I refer to as pseudo market timing, is a problem specifically when abnormal returns are calculated in event time.
The idea behind pseudo market timing is that companies are more likely to sell equity when they can get a high price for it. This emphatically does not mean that companies are able to determine when their stock is overpriced and issue equity at those times. Instead, it means that IPOs become more numerous following high market returns and high returns for comparable firms. In this case, when we as researchers look back on a long time series of IPOs and IPO returns, we will see that IPOs cluster near market peaks. Because they tend to cluster at what were, ex-post, market peaks, IPOs tend to perform poorly in the aftermarket. Simulations in Schultz (2003) suggest that even if managers have no ability to predict future returns, there is a 50 percent chance that cumulative abnormal returns of -18% over five years after the IPO will be observed. Viswanathan and Wei (2003) conduct a rigorous analytical examination of pseudo market timing on measured long-run performance. They show that for fixed sample size, expectations of cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns will be less than zero if the number of events increases with past returns. They show further that abnormal performance will be more negative for longer event periods.
The simulations in Schultz (2003) assume that the number of IPOs is proportional to the level of stock prices -which makes them a random walk. Viswanathan and Wei (2003) and Dahlquist and de Jong (2003) correctly point out that if the number of IPOs is stationary, pseudo market timing is a small sample problem. That is, when the number of months in the sample period approaches infinity, the expected event period abnormal returns become arbitrarily close to zero. This raises two questions. First, does the number of IPOs follow a stationary process?
Second, if the number of IPOs is indeed stationary, is the small sample underperformance likely to be important in practice?
My answer to the first question is that I cannot reject a null hypothesis that the number of IPOs follows a non-stationary process. Like Vishwanathan and Wei (2003) , I employ augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for a unit root. Like them, I reject a unit root when only one lagged value of the number of IPOs is used. I present evidence though, that the number of IPOs is better described by a higher order autoregressive process than by an AR(1). When several lags are included, I cannot reject a unit root at even a ten percent confidence level.
My answer to the second question is yes, even if pseudo market timing is a small sample problem, it is likely to be important in practice. Using a specification for the number of IPOs that is similar in form to that of Viswanathan and Wei (2003) , I find mean buy-and-hold abnormal underperformance of 23 percent for the five years following IPOs. The mean underperformance measured with cumulative abnormal returns is 15.8 percent. The number of IPOs is assumed to follow a non-stationary process in these simulations. My results are much stronger than Viswanathan and Wei's because I use several lags of returns and numbers of IPOs to estimate the total impact of returns on the number of offerings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the first section I discuss whether or not the number of IPOs follows a stationary process and present new evidence that is consistent with non-stationarity. In Section II I report simulations that reveal the importance of pseudo market timing in practice. Section III offers conclusions.
I. Does the Number of Initial Public Offerings Follow a Stationary Process
In Schultz (2003) , I assume that the number of initial public offerings is proportional to the level of the market. If the market level is a random walk, this means the number of IPOs is non-stationary. Is this a reasonable assumption? Consider the following thought experiment.
Right now, the Nasdaq Composite index is approximately 2,000. In 20 years, in 2024, if things go well this index could be around 20,000. If things go very poorly, the index could be around 500. The first case signifies a vibrant, growing economy that has created much wealth for investors. The second indicates a contracting economy and large losses for investors. The assumption that the number of IPOs is proportional to the level of the market is equivalent to saying that the number of IPOs is greater in the vibrant and healthy economy, regardless of stock returns at the time. If we instead assume that the number of IPOs follows a stationary AR (1) process, the expected number of IPOs would be about the same in either case as long as returns were similar in 2022 and 2023. It seems implausible that the number of offerings in the long-run is independent of the condition of the economy in the long-run.
A. Existing Evidence
Viswanathan and Wei (2003) In the regression with the log of the number of IPOs as the dependent variable, Viswanathan and Wei (2003) find that the coefficient on month t-1's return on IPOs is 1.7364, which is significant at the at the five percent level. Higher returns on IPOs in month t-1 leads to more IPOs in month t. The coefficient on the log of the number of IPOs in the previous month is 0.89, with a t-statistic of over 37.
The coefficient on month t-1's number of IPOs is large and indicates a great deal of persistence in the series, but doesn't indicate non-stationarity. Viswanathan and Wei (2003) conduct Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for unit roots in the log number of IPOs. Both of these tests, strongly reject a null hypothesis of a unit root. The same conclusions are reached regardless of whether or not a trend in the number of IPOs is assumed.
The problem with their tests is that they implicitly assume that the log number of IPOs follows an AR(1) process. There are reasons however, to believe that higher order processes should be considered. Suppose that the expected number of IPOs in a month followed an AR (1) process. Assume further that the actual number of offerings is the expected number plus a random component. If we regress the actual number of IPOs in one month on the actual number the previous month, we have an errors in variables problem and the coefficient on the lagged variable will be biased towards zero. If the actual number of IPOs in previous months contains information on the expected number in month t beyond what is contained in the actual number of IPOs at t-1, the number of IPOs in previous months should also be included in the regression.
The problem is compounded in their simulations of the effects of pseudo market timing on returns. Here both the lagged number of IPOs and lagged returns are important. It seems likely that returns should affect the number of IPOs for several months into the future. Suppose that an IPO candidate decides to go public after observing high returns for comparable public firms.
Before the offering takes place it needs to choose an underwriter, draft the necessary statements, file with the SEC, and await SEC approval. The lag between observing that conditions are right for an offering and actually going public may be several months and will differ from firm to firm.
Hence we would expect the number of IPOs in a month to be influenced by returns in several previous months.
B. Regressions of the Number of IPOs on Previous Months' IPOs and Returns
It is easy to demonstrate that the number of IPOs in a month depends on the number of offerings and their returns in several previous months, not just the most recent. IPOs for January 1993 through December 2002 are obtained from SDC. To be consistent with Viswanathan and Wei (2003) , Schultz (2003) and others, IPOs are only included if: (1) the offer price is $1.00 or more, (2) Gross proceeds are $1,000,000 or more, (3) the offering included stock only (no units), (4) the stock appeared on the CRSP tapes within three months of the offering, (5) the IPO was not a closed-end fund, REIT, foreign company, utility, bank or savings and loan. There are 7,088 remaining IPOs.
In Table I The first regression in the table replicates the portion of Viswanathan and Wei's (2003) vector autoregression with the log of the number of IPOs as the dependent variable. The coefficient on the lagged logarithm of the number of IPOs is 0.8686, quite close to the 0.89 estimated by Vishwanathan and Wei. The coefficient on the CRSP value-weighted return from the previous month is 0.9059 and the coefficient on the previous months' IPO return is 1.6652.
The coefficient on the IPO return is similar to Vishwanathan and Wei's estimate of 1.79.
The next column presents estimates of a regression using the excess return on IPOs rather than the raw return. This is just a linear transformation of the previous regression, but I run remaining regressions in this form because it is easier to compare the impact of market and excess returns.
The regression reported in the third column includes three lags of each variable, while the fourth column reports regressions with six lags. When three lags are included, the sum of the coefficients on lagged values of the log number of IPOs goes from 0.8686 to 0.9248. When six lags are included, the sum of the coefficients reaches 0.9527, much closer to 1.0 and nonstationarity than Viswanathan and Wei (2003) find. In addition, coefficients on higher order lags of market returns are positive in five cases and positive and significant at the five percent level in four cases. Market returns have a long-lasting impact on the number of IPOs. Similarly, coefficients on higher order lags of returns of past IPOs are positive for five of the six lags, and positive and significant at the five percent level for three of the six.
The last column of the table reports coefficients from a regression of the log of the number of IPOs on 12 lags of the log of the number of IPOs, the return on the market, and the excess returns of past IPOs. To save space, I report the coefficients for the first six lags of each variable and the sum of the coefficients for lags seven through twelve. F-tests show that the sum of the coefficients for lags seven through twelve are significantly different from zero at the one percent level for both the number of IPOs and the return on the market. The sum of the coefficients for lags seven through twelve on the IPO excess returns is positive, but insignificant.
With the inclusion of the additional lags however, the coefficients on the first six lags of past IPO excess returns increase.
It is clear that examining just one lag for returns and two lags for the number of offerings, as Viswanathan and Wei (2003) do, fails to capture the full effect of stock returns on the number of IPOs. When only one lag is included in Table I , the coefficient on lagged IPO excess returns is 1.67. With 12 lags, the sum of the coefficients is 11.19. Thus when only one lag is used, less than 1/6th of the effect of IPO excess returns on the number of offerings is captured. In addition, as additional lags of the number of IPOs is included, the series looks less and less likely to be stationary. When one lag is included in the regressions, the coefficient on the lagged number of IPOs is 0.8686. The number of IPOs is persistent, but stationary. When six lags are included the coefficient sum reaches 0.9527. When 12 lags are included, the sum of the coefficients reaches 0.9767, a level that suggests non-stationarity is very possible.
C. Formal Tests for Unit Roots
Our evidence suggests that the natural log of the number of IPOs follows a higher-order Table II . The first regression includes the log of the number of IPOs (plus 1/2) in the previous month as an explanatory variable, but does not include any changes in the number of IPOs in previous months. The coefficient on the on the log of the previous month's IPOs is -0.1360, and the MacKinnon p-value allows us to reject a null hypothesis of a unit root at the .01 percent level. This is consistent with the results of Viswanathan and Wei (2003) . But, in a higher order autoregressive process we would expect lagged changes in the number of IPOs to be significant. Regressions 2 through 7 in Table II include from one to six lagged changes in the log of the number of IPOs. When four or more lags are included, we can no longer reject a null hypothesis of a unit root at the five percent level. When five lags are included, the p-value for the null hypothesis of a unit root reaches 9.75% When the sixth lag is added, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at even the ten percent level. The results in Table I suggest that the log number of IPOs in months t-7 through t-12 are a significant predictor of the log number of number of IPOs for month t. When eleven lags are included, as an AR(12) process would suggest, the pvalue of the unit root test is .2565. When a trend is included in the regressions (not shown) pvalues are much higher, indicating even less ability to reject a null hypothesis of a unit root.
II. The Economic Significance of Pseudo Market Timing
Can pseudo market timing result in economically significant underperformance following IPOs? In Viswanathan and Wei (2003) , the effect is small. But, by using only one lag of past returns and two lags of the log number of IPOs in their regressions, they significantly understate the magnitude and persistence of the effects of returns on the number of IPOs.
I use a series of simulations to examine the economic significance of pseudo market timing. In these simulations, like those of Vishwanathan and Wei (2003) , the log number of offerings for a month is determined by the lagged number of offerings, lagged market returns, and lagged IPO returns. The principal difference between these simulations and those of The simulated number of IPOs in a month is generated from the simulated number of IPOs in previous months, the simulated return on the value-weighted market in previous months, and past values of the excess return on the IPO portfolio. The coefficients from the regressions with six or 12 lags, as reported in Table II are used to generate the simulated number of offerings.
Note that in this case, I am not assuming the number of IPOs is non-stationary. The coefficients from the regressions suggest that the effects of returns on the number of IPOs is long-lasting, but not permanent.
Results are reported in Table III . For each specification, I run 1,000 simulations of a 25 year sample period. Table III provides a description of the distribution of abnormal returns across the 1,000 simulations. The first four columns of the table report excess returns when the simulated number of IPOs each month is determined by six lags of simulated market returns, IPO excess returns, and number of IPOs. The mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a 36 month holding period is -6.84%. The mean CAR is negative for 68.7%of the simulations. When we examine returns for the full five years following IPOs, we find the mean CAR is -10.07%.
The next two columns describe the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for three and five years following IPOs. As before, six lags are used to determine the number of IPOs in each simulated month. As a result of compounding, buy-and-hold abnormal returns suggest a greater level of underperformance than cumulative abnormal returns. The mean BHAR is -9.08% for a three year aftermarket period and -16.37% for a five year aftermarket period. Median BHARs are even lower. For half of the simulations, buy-and-hold abnormal returns are less than -11.11% for three years or less than -21.91% for five years.
As shown by the regression in Table I , the number of IPOs and returns seven to twelve months prior to month t are statistically significant predictors of the number of offerings in month t. Hence in the next four columns of Table III we use 12 lags to determine the number of offerings each month. Using the additional lags has a big affect. Now, the mean CAR for a five year period is -15.81% while the mean BHAR is -22.95%. The median BHAR is -28.05%. A closer look at the percentiles of the distribution reveals that 25% of the simulations had five year CARs less than -31.12% and BHARs less than -43.74%.
Comparing the results when six and twelve lags are used to generate the number of IPOs demonstrates two things. First, the effects of pseudo market timing on measurement of long-run abnormal returns can only be appreciated when the persistence of the effects of returns on the number of events is accurately estimated. Second, when reasonable estimates of the permanent effect returns on the number of IPOs is used in simulations, it appears that pseudo market timing can explain much of the poor long-run performance of IPOs.
III. Summary and Conclusions
Dahlquist and de Jong (2003) and Viswanathan and Wei (2003) point out, correctly, that simulations in Schultz (2003) assume that the number of IPOs follows a random walk. They also point out that if the number of IPOs follows a stationary process, pseudo market timing is a small sample problem. This is also correct. The problem with their argument is that the data indicate that the number of IPOs is non-stationary or at least very close to it.
The sum of the coefficients on the number of IPOs in previous months from a regression of the number of current IPOs on previous returns and number of IPOs is over 0.97 -quite close to 1.0. Dickey-Fuller tests fail to reject a unit root in the number of IPOs when a proper number of lags is used. These results are different from Viswanathan and Wei (2003) because they use only one lag in testing for unit roots. My tests show quite clearly that the number of IPOs is related to the previous number of IPOs and previous returns at several lags. The assumption in Schultz (2003) that the number of IPOs follows a random walk appears reasonable.
Of course, even if the number of IPOs is stationary and pseudo market timing is a small sample bias, a small sample may still be very large relative to the time series of IPOs available to researchers. I use simulations with a stationary process for IPOs estimated from the data to examine the importance of pseudo market timing for 25 year sample periods. I find median buyand-hold underperformance of more than 28% for five years after IPOs. The lesson for researchers investigating long-run performance remains the same -use calendar time returns. Table I . Regressions of the natural logarithm of the number of IPOs (plus 1/2) on lagged values of the log of the number of IPOs, lagged values of the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index, and lagged returns of previous months' IPOs.
IPO returns are calculated for each month as an equal-weighted average of the returns of all IPOs from the previous 36 months. Excess returns for IPOs are calculated by subtracting the CRSP value-weighted market return for the month from the IPO return. The sample period is February 1973 through December 2002. To be included in the count of IPOs, the offering must have a price of $1.00 or more, gross proceeds must be $1 million or more, must appear on the CRSP files within three months of the effective date, and the offering must include common stock only (no units). Offerings by funds, REITS, banks, and utilities are also excluded. The sample period is the 359 months from February 1973 through December 2002. The number of IPOs is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of IPOs during the month plus .5. To be included in the count of IPOs, the offering must have a price of $1.00 or more, gross proceeds must be $1 million or more, the stock must be included in the CRSP files within three months of the IPO and the offering must include common stock only (no units). In addition, offerings by funds, REITS, banks, and utilities are excluded. Table III . Simulated event period cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns.
In each simulation, 300 months of simulated market returns are drawn randomly from a normal distribution with mean 0.943% and standard deviation of 0.225%. These are the mean and standard deviations of the monthly CRSP value-weighted market returns over 1973 -2002. For each month, the return of recent IPOs is -0.43695% plus 1.4634 times the return on the market plus a normally distributed error. The error has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.263%. This is the standard deviation of the residuals for the regression of the mean return of stocks with an IPO in the previous 36 months on the CRSP value-weighted market return. The excess returns for IPOs for a month are obtained by subtracting the simulated market returns from the simulated IPO returns. For each month of the simulation, the number of IPOs is calculated based on the returns of the market in the previous six (or 12) months, the excess returns on IPOs in the previous six (or 12) months, and the number of IPOs in each of the past six (12) 
